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Abstract
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity-disorder (ADHD) is a disorder classified by behaviors of
inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity. When put in a task that requires selective attention,
many neurotypical individuals are slower to respond to previously ignored information–a
phenomenon called negative priming–wherein that pattern is not always apparent in individuals
with ADHD. One explanation for negative priming is that it is rooted in memory retrieval,
which proposes that individuals with ADHD are less likely to retrieve information about items
that they have previously ignored. If individuals with ADHD exhibit less negative priming
because they are less likely to retrieve prior information, then they may also exhibit reduced
proactive interference. Proactive interference is observed in recall tasks when old information
interferes with current recall. It was predicted that those with ADHD would be less affected by
old information and therefore exhibit atypical proactive interference, as compared to
neurotypical individuals. In the current study, ADHD was assessed using the CAARS S:S (in
Bates College participants) and ASRS (in Amazon Mechanical Turk participants) scales.
Proactive interference, measured using a Brown-Peterson task, was intact among those with
ADHD. In a second experiment, negative priming, assessed using a flanker task, suggested that
negative priming may be absent in individuals with ADHD, though the findings remain
inscrutable. This may be indicative of intact memory retrieval in those with ADHD, and further
attribute negative priming effects to underlying mechanisms unassociated with memory
retrieval.
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An Examination of Proactive Interference and Negative Priming in Individuals wIth and
without Attention-Deficit/Hyperactive Disorder
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) has become increasingly prevalent in
the media in recent years. Much of the information online, especially in pop psychychology,
relay inaccurate or misleading information–wherein it continues to be considered by many as an
insignificant and unimportant deficiency despite leading to glaring difficulties and impactful
issues in the lives of those diagnosed with ADHD (Low, 2021). The current study examines
ADHD over the course of three experiments. I begin by discussing
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and its clinical and physiological manifestations. Next, I
review negative priming and the prominent theories behind it. Correspondingly, I mention
several associated studies examining negative priming effects on those diagnosed with ADHD
compared to neurotypical individuals. Of the mentioned proposed theories, I focus my review
on the implicit-retrieval memory-based theories and inhibitory theories. Finally, I discuss
another memory-based effect: proactive interference. Subsequently, I discuss the features of
proactive interference as well as prominent past studies associated with it.
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, or ADHD, is a disorder that can be classified by
behaviors of inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity, hindering an individual’s ability to
function as well as their development. Individuals with ADHD usually have issues with both
hyperactivity-impulsivity and inattention, though some individuals primarily display one or the
other (Parekh, 2017). Most people experience these behaviors to some degree; however, it
becomes a problem when such behaviors interfere with and reduce the quality of an individual’s
life. According to the National Institute of Mental Health (2019), individuals who struggle
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primarily with symptoms of inattention, also struggle with actions and feelings such as
overlooking details, maintaining attention for tasks and conversations, procrastinating tasks that
require mental attention and effort, staying organized, meeting deadlines, distractions,
forgetfulness, etc. Individuals who struggle primarily with hyperactivity-impulsivity have issues
with actions and tasks such as staying in one place, excessive talking, and interrupting others.
These symptoms must be consistent over time and chronic for a physician to diagnose an
individual with ADHD, though symptoms are subject to change over time (Meyer & Lasky,
2021).
Physiology of ADHD
Physiologically, the dysfunction in the dopaminergic and noradrenergic
neurotransmitters are implicated in adversities presented by ADHD; both of these
neurotransmitters are additionally fundamental parts of the frontostriatal and frontoparietal
circuits (Arnsten et al., 1996). As such, individuals with ADHD have been seen to display
irregular activity in the prefrontal cortex, frontoparietal and frontostriatal circuits (Booth et al.,
1995; Castellanos, 1997; Durston et al., 2003; Giedd et al., 2001; Lou et al., 1989; Seidman,
2005). The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is seen to be implicated in cognitive control
and attention direction, is therefore of particular interest regarding its dysfunction in individuals
with ADHD. This performance discrepancy becomes apparent through the implementation of a
Stroop (1935) task to assess inhibitory control in conjunction with magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI). A Stroop task is where participants have to identify the color in which the word is
written when presented with a color word while ignoring the written word. For instance, the
word “red” could be written in the color green, in which case the participants would have to
respond with green. Though no significant disparities were able to be identified based on Stroop
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task performance, the data showed that those with ADHD presented with significant thinning in
the right rostral ACC, which also accounted for a significant amount of the variance found in
the symptoms reported by the parents and teachers of the participants; based on this correlation,
it was concluded that the ACC plays a role in behaviors of inattention, impulsivity, and
hyperactivity (Bledsoe et al., 2013).
Other anatomical regions have been associated with the neurological deficits of ADHD,
particularly in the frontostriatal network, involving the lateral prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex, and caudal nucleus. Additionally, a substantial decay was present in the total
cerebral volume in the prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia (striatum), dorsal anterior cingulate,
cortex, corpus callosum, and cerebellum (Emond et al., 2009). Developmental studies
conducted on individuals with and without ADHD showed impediments in cortical maturation
over the course of three years compared to the neurotypical controls. MRI data has additionally
correlated ADHD symptoms with diminished white matter connectivity and volume within the
midsagittal corpus callosum areas and further corroborated the findings regarding reduced
cortical thickness (Makris et al., 2008). These irregularities in white matter are ubiquitous
throughout the brain primarily affecting the inferior parietal, occipitoparietal, inferior frontal,
and inferior temporal cortex, regions which constitute a portion of the white matter pathways
connecting the prefrontal and parietooccipital regions with the striatum and cerebellum. White
matter pathways affected are also seen in prefrontal regions and in pathways proximal to the
basal ganglia and cerebellum. This suggests decreased myelin sheathing of axons may lead to
less insulation of the neuronal impulses, and ergo elicit inefficient action potentials (Curatolo et
al., 2010; D'Agati et al., 2010).
Clinical Diagnosis of ADHD
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Clinically, ADHD is diagnosed on a behavioral rather than biological basis based on the
prevalence of symptoms of inattention in comparison to hyperactivity. According to DSM-V
criteria, at least five symptoms of either hyperactivity, impulsivity, or both, must persist for six
months or more to be recognized as an adult ADHD diagnosis (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). There are three different subtypes of ADHD: inattentive,
impulsive-hyperactive, and combined. Though there is no apparent cause for ADHD, there are
several contributing factors including genes, alcohol or drug use during pregnancy, smoking
during pregnancy, exposure to high amounts of toxins as an infant, being underweight at birth,
and brain injuries. Currently, there is no cure for this condition, however, symptoms can be
managed using medications, psychotherapy, education, or a combination of any of these (Oh et
al., 2018).
ADHD is prevalent in 4.4% of the adult population, though it is chronically
underdiagnosed (National Institute of Mental Health); fewer than 20% of adults with ADHD
receive a diagnosis or treatment (Hallowell, 2021). It has been shown to be associated with
other psychiatric disorders such as mood disorder, anxiety disorder, substance abuse, as well as
antisocial and illegal behaviors. As such, ADHD has been shown to incite numerous long-term
health and economic consequences–including costs to an individual’s mental health, education,
social service, and criminal justice. Adults with ADHD were also seen to display significant
functional impairments. Despite these ramifications, ADHD continues to be clinically
underrepresented (Oh et al., 2018).
ADHD and Anxiety
Individuals with ADHD have been shown in the literature to have a particularly high
comorbidity rate with anxiety disorder, being prevalent in 34% to 40% of individuals with an
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ADHD diagnosis (Sobanski 2007; Uchida et al., 2018). It is considered to be among the highest
inherited psychiatric disorders with a 76% chance of an individual inheriting symptoms of
anxiety (Johnson et al., 2009). Experiencing anxiety is also seen to increase the liability for
other psychiatric disorders–such as depression, somatoform disorder, conduct disorder, and
substance abuse–and is often a pertinent element in the prognosis and treatment of various
psychiatric disorders, including ADHD (Gaynes et al., 1999; Hensley & Varela, 2008; Schmidt
et al., 2007). Anxiety can have significant repercussions on one’s self-esteem, social
relationships, academic performance, and is shown to lead to considerable functional
impairments (Nima et al., 2013; Richardson et al., 2012). Further, anxiety has been seen to be a
mediator between the severity of ADHD symptoms and functional impairment (Kroenke et al.,
2013). High sensitivity to anxiety can provide foresight regarding the severity of an individual’s
panic disorder, and can increase the risk of a mood disorder, psychosomatic disorder, and
post-traumatic stress disorder. Additionally, it can increase the probability of suicidal ideation
and poor impulse control, which in combination can be detrimental and even lead to suicidal
ideations and attempts (Oh et al., 2018). With ADHD, anxiety has been shown to foreshadow
poor behavioral regulation and externalizing issues in ADHD children (Brooker et al., 2020).
Furthermore, both conditions have been recently found to share a common genetic
pathophysiology. Greater levels of anxiety have been significantly positively correlated with the
severity of ADHD symptoms; trait anxiety predominantly moderates elements of impulsivity
and emotional liability associated with anxiety (Oh et al., 2018).
Theories of ADHD
There have been a wide array of theories proposed attempting to describe the differences
seen in those with ADHD. One major category of ADHD theories include cognitive dysfunction
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theories which attribute ADHD discrepancies to deficits in sustained attention and response
inhibition (Barkley, 1997), working memory (Baddeley, 1992), and executive function (i.e., the
cognitive mechanisms necessary to sustain the appropriate response) (Willcutt et al., 2005). For
example, the Inhibition Model (Barkley et al., 1992; Barkley, 1997) suggests that ADHD core
deficits are a consequence of poor behavioral inhibition. Similarly, the Executive Dysfunction
Theory postulates ADHD arises from diminished executive control as a consequence of
deviations in physiology, function, and chemical processes in frontoparietal and frontostriatal
neuronal circuitries (Aman et al., 1998; Barkley et al., 1992; Barnett et al., 2001; Breen, 1989;
Cairney et al., 2001; Carter et al., 1995; Willcutt et al., 2005). In contrast, state regulation
models of ADHD suggest that such individuals have inadequate allotted supplemental effort
causing them to struggle with persistent maintenance of the optimal arousal state. ADHD
symptoms may be exacerbated or impeded depending on the current cognitive state of the
individual; for instance, inattentive symptoms may be more evident in less cognitively
demanding or slower tasks (Johnson et al., 2009). Alternatively, several theories have
emphasized the importance of reinforcement processes (Shiels & Hawk, 2010). For instance,
one theory posits that inhibition, or executive function, and delay aversion performance
demonstrate two independent pathways (Dalen et al., 2004; Sonuga-Barke et al., 2003). In this
consolidated paradigm, inattention and hyperactivity in ADHD are credited to efforts in
minimizing the delay of experienced gratification in appropriate circumstances where such
delay is inevitable. Another major reinforcement theory behind ADHD is the Dynamic
Developmental Theory (DDT), which ascribes ADHD deficiencies to inappropriate
reinforcement and inadequate extinction of incorrect behavior (Sagvolden et al., 2005) which
must occur within a critical time period for neurotypical individuals, and similarly fails to be
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impeded due to lower baseline levels of dopamine–as phasic reduction of said dopamine is
typically indicative of extinction processes. This consequently suggests impaired anterior
cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal, and motor circuit activity (Johnson et al., 2009; Shiels &
Hawk, 2010).
Negative Priming
There have been many studies done over the years regarding the cognitive differences
among individuals with ADHD versus neurotypical individuals (Christiansen & Oades, 2010;
Curatolo et al., 2010; Gaultney et al., 1999; Gilden, 2002; Keppel & Underwood, 1962;
Marriott, 1998; Mclaughlin, 2003; Ossman & Mulligan, 2003; Pritchard et al., 2006; Pritchard
et al., 2008; Shin, 2005; Shin, 2006; Storm & White 2010; White, 2007). One important
discovery that has been recurrently deliberated is potential disparities in levels of negative
priming presented in those diagnosed with ADHD. Negative priming is a phenomenon in which
individuals are slower to respond to previously ignored items, known as the ignored repetition,
than items that were not previously ignored, the control (Tipper, 1985). For example, if an
individual is asked to say aloud the letter in the middle of “ABA” in the first round and then the
letter in the middle of “CAC” in the second round, reaction times in the second round will be
slower than situations where they had not just ignored the target letter (A).
An Overview of the Proposed Theories Regarding Negative Priming
A reduction in negative priming in individuals with ADHD indicates that whatever
cognitive mechanism is responsible for negative priming may be disrupted with ADHD. There
are several theories behind the reasoning for why negative priming occurs, most notably
characterized as inhibition theories or retrieval-based accounts. In generally comparing the two
major frameworks, inhibition theories involve either activation of the prime target and inhibition
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of the prime distractor (Frings et al., 2015); however, where inhibition theory involves
inhibiting distractors which must subsequently be responded to, retrieval theories attribute
slower response times to complications in memory retrieval.
Inhibition Theory
The original explanation for negative priming is the inhibition theory–which, as the
name suggests, attributes the phenomenon to inhibitory causes—and claims that negative
priming reflects a person's ability to inhibit distracting information. In 1985, Tipper did a study
evaluating the processing of ignored objects during the selection of an attended object; he
evaluated their stage of internal representation and the fate of said representation. A three-part
study was conducted to ascertain the presence of negative priming, the effect on negative
priming of a shortened interstimulus interval, and the priming effects experienced by both the
selected and ignored objects. Results showed that there was, in fact, an opposite priming effect
(i.e., negative priming) on objects that had previously been ignored eliciting longer response
times. This is suggestive of the fact that during selection on the probe trial, the internal
representation of the ignored item may be affiliated with inhibition. Response times when the
selected and ignored objects were semantically related increased by 31 milliseconds, suggesting
that ignored objects may be processed at the categorical level, and ergo, inhibition may also be
at this level (Tipper, 1985). Rather than progressively diminishing, mental representations of
ignored objects are further processed such that their next representations are hindered (Tipper,
1987).
These findings are further reinforced by the finding that if the probe and prime were
presented immediately without an interstimulus interval, negative priming did not have time to
form and was thereby diminished; that is, negative priming needed time to be developed
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(Tipper, 1985). This theory later extrapolated into the Selective Inhibition Account, which
additionally proposed that such inhibition may only be implemented if the activated mental
representations and the behaviors are consistent; if not, the organism is inclined to inhibit the
desired response (Fox, 1995; Tipper et al., 1994). This account differs from the inhibition
account as it proposes that an additional step involving the facilitation of relevant information
(i.e. amplification) in addition to inhibition of irrelevant information. According to this view,
people with ADHD may have more difficulty inhibiting distraction than individuals without
ADHD. This view would attribute negative priming to inhibition in attention rather than
retrieval in memory.
Implicit-Retrieval Based/Selective Attention Theories behind Negative Priming
Feature Mismatch Account
Implicit retrieval-based theories posit that negative priming is due to trace activation in
memory of a perceived target mirroring the specific stimulus from a previously processed
episode. In the previous trials, the memory trace of the indicated target stimulus was previously
appraised to be “ignored” or as “do not respond,” thereby interfering with one’s ability to
rapidly and accurately respond to said item. One such theory is the feature mismatch account,
which speculates that negative priming may be attributed to a discrepancy among the features of
an ignored item in the prime conditions and subsequent probe targets (Fox, 1995).
This is corroborated by a study done by Lowe (1979) with a Stroop color-naming task
whereupon a color-word was presented in the prime stimulus followed by an unanticipated
presentation of another color-word or color-patch. This study found significant negative priming
was present when the color word was congruent with the probe stimulus, however, when the
probe was a color patch, responses were facilitated. He argued that if the color name presented
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in the probe-target is dually displayed as an ignored distractor and the selected target–that is, if
participants were presented with the word “blue” written in red, followed by the word “yellow”
written in blue–this causes the color name to be highly inscrutable. This incompatibility–or
mismatch–among the stimuli elicits further processing of the stimuli to “check,” resulting in
slower response times, producing negative priming due to the mismatch of features between the
ignored distractor and subsequent target (Fox, 1995).
Alternatively, the selective inhibition account would not attribute this finding to the
same mechanisms as it ascribes negative priming to the inhibition of an ignored item that then
becomes the target. The feature mismatch theory describes negative priming as a feedforward
effect from mismatching messages from successional trials rather than the distractor inhibition
from the prime trial lingering during the probe display (Fox, 1995).
Episodic Retrieval Theory
Episodic retrieval theory is another theory behind negative priming which is implicitly
based in information retrieval (Neill et al., 1992). It is premised on the idea that information
retrieved from the prime display contradicts the current and the correct response; that is, people
tag in memory what should and should not be responded to on each trial. This theory highlights
the role of the stimulus in the probe display as a memory-retrieval cue. It essentially postulates
that in an ignored repetition condition, the probe-target is processed causing the automatic
retrieval of the prime display in the preceding processing episode–which may contain
information regarding the status of the item (i.e., as relevant/respond or irrelevant/do not
respond). That is, in ignored repetition trials, an episodic memory trace encoding a
non-response status conflicts with the appropriate response (Fox, 1995). To give an example, if
participants were shown ABA and asked to report the middle letter, they will store in memory
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“respond B” and “ignore A”. If people are later shown CAC and if they recall the prior
information, then they will have slow responses because they will recall that the letter A should
be ignored (Neill et al., 1992).
Though this is quite similar to the feature mismatch theory, the episodic retrieval theory
requires the probe-target to be previously classified as a distractor for negative priming to occur,
while the feature mismatch theory stipulates that the current target must simply be present in
preceding trials, as either the distractor or the target, for the development of negative priming.
In fact, the episodic retrieval theory has been argued to be more closely related to the selective
inhibition theory of negative priming, as both presume that the target’s previous identity as an
ignored distractor is the crucial element for negative priming.
Additional Variants of Retrieval-Based Negative Priming Theories
There have also been multiple derivatives of the retrieval-based theory of negative
priming. For instance, Neill and Mathis (1998) proposed a new modified version of the episodic
retrieval theory, applicable to numerous cognitive effects: the transfer-(in)appropriate
processing (TIP/TAP) account. Though quite similar to episodic retrieval accounts of negative
priming, this model is an extended account of said theory, and thereby able to be implemented
to a variety of other cognitive effects beyond negative priming. This essentially states that a
stimulus reintroduces processing activities that were previously applied to itself or a
corresponding stimulus–observed in both implicit and explicit processing. In other words, the
cognitive representation of said distractor may be facilitated in an ignored repetition trial;
however, responses encoded for such items are now deemed inappropriate and thus cause
interference in evaluating the target response (Fringes et al., 2015; Neill & Mathis, 1998).
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Another perspective regarding negative priming is the temporal discrimination theory
(Milliken et al., 1998; Milliken & Joordens, 1996). This postulates that the time required for the
attentional system to determine whether the display is old (i.e., known) or new (i.e., yet
unknown) is a function of the similarities between the prime and probe displays. If the prime
distractor is subsequently implemented as the target in the probe, the display then holds both
new and old information, slowing response times. This ambiguity may be the source of negative
priming in ignored-repetition conditions. As this theory is quite similar to others, Frings et al.
(2015) suggest that this account be integrated with others to construct a preferential retrieval
account.
The stimulus-response retrieval theory may be seen as another variant of the episodic
retrieval theory (Hommel, 1998; Hommel, 2004). This theory states that the entirety of the
prime episode is consolidated into an event file in memory–including the prime target,
distractors, and reaction to said target, which is then involuntarily retrieved if a formerly seen
stimulus reappears. This activates a previously executed response, facilitating performance if
the current and encoded responses coincide, and inhibiting it otherwise (i.e., slowing response
times) (Frings et al., 2015). Though very similar, the episodic retrieval theory suggests an
implicit cognitive selection of the distractor encoded with a do-not-respond tag and the target
encoded with a tag indicating a response. Meanwhile, the stimulus retrieval theory makes no
indication of any selection occurring in the prime display, but rather, that the entirety of the
episode is encoded; this theory is distinct from those earlier theories as it does not assume
selective encoding or storing to any degree (Frings et al., 2015).
Lastly, an expansion of the stimulus retrieval theory, named the binding and retrieval in
action control (BRAC), is a memory-based theory that can be applied to effects beyond negative
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priming. It is based on two core processes: feature binding and retrieval, and stipulates that
current behaviors are molded by events in the immediate past (Frings et al., 2020). In terms of
negative priming, the BRAC account claims that the prime stimuli and affiliated response are
stored in an event file, which then upon the reappearance of some distractor, is retrieved along
with an incompatible prime response in response to the probe display–thus causing interference
(Frings et al., 2020).
Discussion of the Theories of Negative Priming
Essentially the differences in negative priming theories represent distinct predictions
regarding the required aspects and processing of the prime display for negative priming to
occur. For instance, selection against the distractor is necessary for priming in the distractor
inhibition and episodic retrieval accounts but not in feature mismatch or temporal
discriminability (Mayr & Buchner, 2007).
The feature mismatch and temporal discriminability theories lack substantial empirical
evidence to be considered adequate models for negative priming (Mayr & Buchner, 2007). In
terms of distractor inhibition as opposed to the episodic retrieval model, the evidence seems to
lean towards the latter (Neill et al., 1992). Though Tipper's (1985) finding of semantic negative
priming is better illustrated by the inhibition account, as they typically assume the capacity for
neural spread expected to be present in such cognitive effects, the inhibition model fails to
justify the presence of increased negative priming as a result of contextual resemblance among
the prime and the probe (Fox & de Fockert, 1998; Neill, 1997; Stolz & Neely, 2001; Wong,
2000). By contrast, the episodic retrieval model suggests the representation of certain episodes,
or memories, being stored, unassociated with any neural network. Episodic retrieval better
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explicates the consequence of temporal discriminability in the probe trial as a result of trials
prior (Neill et al., 1992).
The assumption made by inhibition accounts suggesting that probe interference is
necessary for negative priming has been disproven. The formal connectionist model of
inhibition proposed by Tipper et al. (1998) proposed that mental representations of stimuli
compete for dominance over the response network according to their activation advantages; the
probe shows reduced activation from inhibition in trials prior causing it to take longer to attain
the threshold activation necessary for negative priming. This is seen in single probe conditions,
where negative priming is absent as no competition is present between the cognitive
representations of stimuli (Frings & Wentura, 2007). These findings can rather be rationalized
as a consequence of learning strategies. Learning of prime and probe associations is likely
facilitated by the absence of interference. This serves as evidence against the response blocking
component of distractor inhibition accounts (Mayr & Buchner, 2007).
Inhibition theory also falls short in its rationale with the findings showing positive
priming in single probe effects; this facilitation is rather explained by the blocking of the
distractor stimuli being forsaken when there is no need for selection (Milliken & Joordens,
1996). Probe stimuli that are presented without interference fail to impose positive priming,
disputing the credibility of distractor inhibition theory. Predominantly, the findings of the
inhibition model are outdated and need to be reassessed with consideration of more recent
developments in the literature (Mayr & Buchner, 2007). Further, studies have shown
congruence among features does not play a significant role in the magnitude of observed
negative priming, concluding the feature mismatch theory is not seen as a good fit (Mayr &
Buchner, 2007).
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Negative Priming and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
There have been many studies looking at the diminished behavioral negative priming in
individuals with ADHD (Christiansen & Oades, 2010; Curatolo et al., 2010; Gaultney et al.,
1999; Gilden, 2001; Keppel & Underwood, 1962; Marriott, 1998; Mclaughlin, 2003; Ossman &
Mulligan, 2003; Pritchard et al., 2006; Pritchard et al., 2008; Shin, 2005; Shin, 2006; Storm &
White 2010; White, 2007). Christiansen and Oades (2010) compared response times of 35
children who were diagnosed with ADHD, 24 of their siblings who were unaffected by ADHD,
and 37 other individuals between the ages of six to 17 without ADHD who were the
independent controls when completing a Stroop task. They found that with the congruent
condition, in children without diagnosed ADHD, there was apparent negative priming upon
onset of the test. In comparison, the children with diagnosed ADHD initially displayed reduced
levels of negative priming, seen to be independent of age or symptom severity, however, they
performed in parallel to the control otherwise. Christiansen and Oades concluded that negative
priming was initially reduced in cases of children with ADHD. Further, the negative priming
effects were seen to be masked in the incongruent condition. As trials progressed, both groups
showed increased facilitation from congruence among subsequent trials as opposed to response
suppression from the previous trial (Christiansen & Oades, 2010). Additionally, the overall
pattern of negative priming in both groups of participants across trials allowed for the
conclusion that priming from the past trials increased accuracy, and that individuals with ADHD
presented with abnormalities with respect to negative priming effects (Christiansen & Oades,
2010).
This reasoning is neurologically reinforced as a further indication of impaired negative
priming among the experimental group as individuals with ADHD have been seen to display
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impaired frontal lobe activity in regions implicated in attentional processing (Biederman, 2005;
Bush, et al., 2005) This is supported by the finding that individuals with fronted lobe damage
display similar inhibition of negative priming (i.e., positive priming) (Stuss et al., 1999).
A similar study assessed negative priming in individuals with ADHD over two different
conceptual tasks: the Flanker test and the Stroop test. Responses were compared as a function of
comorbid versus not-comorbid and type of ADHD as combined ADHD versus inattentive
ADHD. Response time regarding identifying a color in an unrelated priming and ignored
repetition condition were recorded. In the Flanker task, uniquely shaped color blobs were
presented in 11 sets of three composed of a central target blob peripherally accompanied by two
distractor blobs; there were 11 different colors for blob presentation (the same colors used in
their Stroop task) with the distractor and target never appearing congruently in terms of color.
The results of this study indicated that comorbidity in regards to ADHD does seem to have an
effect on negative priming in specific tasks. This study showed that the not-comorbid and
comorbid ADHD groups had comparable and intact negative priming in the Stroop task.
Further, similar and sufficient negative priming was observed in the combined ADHD and
inattentive ADHD subtypes. On the other hand, in the Flanker tasks, negative priming was only
present in the not-comorbid group and absent in the comorbid ADHD group. In this task,
negative priming was equally absent for both subtypes of combined ADHD and inattentive
ADHD. This indicated that comorbidity in regards to ADHD does seem to have an effect on
negative priming in specific tasks. This may suggest that comorbidity produced a confounding
effect on the results of prior studies, potentially clarifying the reason behind the contradictory
results presented in the past literature, as a majority of past studies did not control for
comorbidity (Pritchard et al., 2008).
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The negative priming and ADHD are seen in the literature to be quite ambiguous due to
contradictory findings. The findings of Pritchard et al. (2008) may suggest that comorbidity
produced a confounding effect on the results of prior studies, potentially clarifying the reason
behind the contradictory results presented in the past literature, as a majority of past studies did
not control for comorbidity (Pritchard et al., 2008). Previous studies showing no difference in
negative priming between the ADHD and non-ADHD groups were performed using the Stroop
task (Gaultney et al., 1999; Pritchard et al., 2006), in contrast to the studies which did find
reduced negative priming that employed far more simplistic tasks, more like the Flanker task
employed in my study (Marriott, 1998; Ossman & Mulligan, 2003). It is possible that tasks
involving attentional focus culminate in selective deployment of attention in individuals with
ADHD and an additional comorbid diagnosis. Further, it may be the case that the added
dimensional congruences among stimuli and the semantically related (rather than based on
identity) stimuli in the Stroop task may result in producing a sufficient negative priming effect
in those with ADHD (Pritchard et al., 2008). Another possible factor resulting in the
inconsistencies in the literature is the variability in conceptualized ADHD. As aforementioned,
there are numerous frameworks for ADHD, including Barkley’s (1997) Theory of ADHD,
which posited that combined ADHD is primarily distinguished by behavioral deficits rather than
cognitive. Opposingly, inattentive ADHD is primarily attributed to selective attention
independent of behavioral inhibition. As the different subtypes of ADHD have different
attributes, it is possible that the inconsistent results present in the literature are a consequence of
failing to consider the ADHD subtype (Barkley, 1997).
Shin (2006) further explored this discrepancy in the literature through the use of a letter
matching task (two target items were placed between distractors and participants had to identify
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whether the targets were the same) and a localization task (where participants had to identify the
location of a larger target placed among smaller distractors). Individuals with inattentive-type
ADHD presented with higher levels of negative priming relative to the combined ADHD and
control groups, in whom inhibition was seen to be additive. Additionally, those with inattentive
ADHD showed a sharp release of negative priming around 1000 milliseconds which was not
paralleled in the combined or control groups. Specifically, in the letter-matching task, both types
of ADHD presented with a stark drop in facilitation between 500 and 1000 milliseconds
whereas it remained stable for the control group as a function of the time delay between the
response and stimuli interval. Contrarily, the two ADHD groups showed an abrupt build-up of
facilitation between the same time interval, and the control again remained plateaued. In terms
of inhibition, the data showed inattentive ADHD displayed greater negative priming than the
control implying distractor information may be inhibited beyond what is required. Those with
combined ADHD evidenced intact negative priming, on par with that seen in the control group.
This, along with those with inattentive ADHD being unable to inhibit distractor information
persistently as long as the control, can potentially be attributed to insufficient processes of
inhibition. Further, equal facilitation was seen between the two ADHD subtypes, which was
significantly different than that seen in the control. This may suggest that facilitation is more
volatile among individuals with inattentive or combined ADHD relative to neurotypical
individuals. The discerning patterns of inhibition and facilitation are congruent with Barkley’s
claims regarding the framework of inattentive ADHD being based in selective attention (Shin,
2006).
Those findings were established upon a previous study by Shin (2005) where a Stroop
task was used to evaluate the mechanism behind cognitive inhibition in individuals with ADHD
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(Shin, 2005). The stimuli presentation times were manipulated between 500 milliseconds and
1000 milliseconds. Those in the ADHD group had slower reaction times and lower accuracy
than the control group. Additionally, individuals with ADHD showed reduced negative priming
compared to the neurotypical participants under the 500 milliseconds time presentation
condition (Shin, 2005), again consistent with Barkley’s (1997) Model of ADHD. Furthermore,
the ADHD group showed greater reaction times in the 500 milliseconds condition relative to the
control group. Adversely, the opposite was observed within the 1000 milliseconds condition,
wherein the ADHD group displayed a greater, though the difference was very small, level of
negative priming compared to the control (Shin, 2005). Overall, the reaction times in the 1000
milliseconds condition were longer and thus greater than the conventional duration of inhibition
in neurotypical individuals (Gilden, 2001). It was thus postulated that if children with ADHD
are considered to have deficient processing, it can be concluded that they conjointly can be
considered to have deficiencies in selective attention (Shin, 2005).
Fundamentally, the aforementioned studies indicate the speculation that the inhibitory
theories regarding negative priming may not be a comprehensive enough explanation of the
phenomena and its effects. It is possible that the mechanism fundamental to negative priming
may also have roots in memory retrieval, favoring the involvement of implicit-retrieval
based/selective attention theories.
Proactive Interference
The suggestion that negative priming may be a consequence of inadequate retrieval from
memory in those with ADHD proposes the possibility that said individuals are also abnormally
impacted by the effects of proactive interference. Essentially, in the framework of the
memory-based theories of negative priming, reduced levels of negative priming for individuals
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with ADHD may indicate that this group of individuals is less likely to retrieve the “do not
respond” tag ascribed to distractors from past trials. Following that reasoning, individuals with
ADHD may also exhibit different levels of proactive interference, defined as when older
information interferes with an individual’s memory for current information. Brown (1958) and
Peterson and Peterson (1959) were instrumental in developing a task involving the presentation
of target stimuli in triads along with some distractor task (such as counting backward), which
significantly affects recall within a 20-second time interval. This task has proven to be
fundamental in studying cognitive effects such as proactive interference to evaluate the
immediate and delayed recall within short-term memory, as well as assess the direction of
attention and information processing in working memory and executive function (Brown, 1958;
Mertens et al., 2006; Peterson &Peterson, 1959).
Keppel and Underwood (1962) studied proactive interference by looking at
performance as a function of how long participants had been in the experiment. They had three
trials; in the first trial, participants were given a list of three consonants and then asked to count
backward for three, nine, or 18 seconds. In the first trial, participants had perfect recall, there
were no mistakes, and the amount of time counting backward had no effect. However, as the
trials progressed, performance got worse. This can be attributed to a build-up of proactive
interference. Here, the old trials are affecting the ability to remember the material introduced in
the recent trial. The similarities between the presented stimuli, in this case, due to all the stimuli
being letters, cause information from new and old trials to be muddled and thus cause
interference. Keppel and Underwood suggested one possible explanation for this is that people
have difficulty discriminating the new from the old in short-term memory, therefore in the first
trial, there was no interference from trials before, resulting in the perfect recall. In the later
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trials, when individuals tried to recall letters from the recent trial, they remember letters from
previous trials instead, and all the old letters are interfering with remembering the new letters.
Wickens et al. (1963) proposed that triplets of words sharing homologous physical or
semantic characteristics are grouped collectively in short-term memory as a single item and
even further, a unique psychological class. When successive items are no longer comparative in
class, the interference effect dissipates, suggesting the involvement of cognitive organization in
the effects of proactive interference. They conducted a study in which there were two classes of
words: those that were obviously related, and those with more complicated associations. The
words were presented in triplets over sets of three to four trials in which the class of words was
varied between each set. Participants showed a decrease in performance as the trials progressed.
This provoked the assumption that there is a common thread involving cognitive encoding of
stimuli in a certain class which is seen in a steep increase in performance between class
switching. This is because there is no longer interference from old stored stimuli similarly
stored due to trait congruences causing proactive interference (Wickens et al., 1963). This data
indicates that greater similarity among stimuli will lead to greater interference in memory and
more difficulty with retrieval from it; this finding is evidenced in the literature as well
(Freidman & Reynolds, 1967; McGeoch & McDonald, 1931; Postman, 1965).
In essence, changing the class of words presented leads to a release from the proactive
interference effect, indicating that inhibitory effects are a result of semantically similar items
being confused in memory (Craig et al., 2013). This was also seen by Wickens and Clark (1968)
in their study examining words with acoustic similarities and synonymous words in
characteristically similar triplets. They found increased proactive interference (decrease in
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performance) over categorically related trials and a striking increase in performance
between-group shifts (Craig et al., 2013).
This leads to one plausible theory for why release from proactive interference
occurs–the retrieval hypothesis. Evidence for this theory was found in a classic study done by
Gardiner et al. (1972). In the study, people were told they needed to remember the information
which they would be given. They were given a list of three items to remember and then given
ten unrelated backwardly spelled distractor words at a rate of 1.5 seconds per word and asked to
read them out loud before recalling the initial list of three words. Then, participants had a subtle
category shift in their list of items on their last trial. For example, if the first three trials were
cultivated flowers then the last trial would be wildflowers. They had different categories like
this where participants had difficulty identifying what had changed unless they were notified of
it. In their study, there were three groups of subjects. Group one was not informed of the
category shift; they were the control group. In group one, the conductors of the study saw a
buildup of proactive interference. Performance was seen to decrease on every single trial. Group
two was informed of the change before the start of the experiment. This group showed a release
in proactive interference in trial four where their performance increased dramatically. One
possible explanation for their responses may be that these individuals encoded the information
better, which means they were storing it into memory better as they knew about the change
when they got the list of items and therefore it stood out to them. Another possibility is that they
were better at the time of retrieval, meaning that the participants had all these flower names
floating around in memory, and at the time of retrieval they were able to pick out the
wildflowers more easily. Participants in the third group were informed of the category shift after
the fourth trial but before the recall. They processed this information in the same manner as
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group two, demonstrating a release from proactive interference. These results suggest the
release from proactive interference is due to a benefit from the time of retrieval since this group
had no encoding benefit but they performed equivalently to group two. From their data, Gardner
et al. (1972) saw a buildup of proactive interference as performance decreased in over trials,
resulting from the semantic similarities of the presented stimuli. It is not that the information is
stored better, but rather it is just easier to retrieve.
Proactive Interference and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
An analysis of the existing literature revealed no conclusive studies comparing proactive
interference in neurotypical individuals and those with ADHD. In a study done by Egeland et al.
(2010) individuals with different kinds of ADHD were seen to deploy significantly less efficient
learning strategies compared to the neurotypical control group which was positively correlated
with greater inconsistencies in memory. Participants were presented with two lists of words
consisting of four sets of four semantically related words presented so that there were no
categorically related items shown in sequence. List A contained four words from four
semantically related categories of well-known words presented such that no two words from the
same category were sequentially presented, and list B, the distractor list, contained a list of four
distractor words. List A was shown over five learning trials, followed by the presentation and
oral recall of the distractor list. Then, participants were asked to recall the items from the
initially presented list A, once after recalling the distractor list, then again half an hour later.
Specifically, proactive interference was assessed using the magnitude of the difference between
response accuracy between lists A and B. Individuals with ADHD were shown to have
diminished activity in the four assessed paradigms: diminished semantic clustering, retroactive
interference, proactive interference, and performance for words presented in the middle of the
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list. The results of this study showed decreased proactive interference in the inattentive ADHD
group compared to the control, however, facilitation in performance was observed in the
combined ADHD group, essentially presenting with no proactive interference. The authors
hypothesize that this may be a result of either lower levels of semantic processing or possibly
impaired inhibition, though it may potentially also be related to deficiencies in information
retrieval (Egeland et al., 2010).
In a study done assessing learning in children with ADHD and the effect of sensory
distractors, those with ADHD were found to less accurately recall information for all sections
apart from the beginning in short-term memory tasks (Higginbotham & Bartling, 1993). This
study employed a mixed factorial design to assess the effects of distractors on short-term
memory in children with ADHD. Participants were individually tested on 30 statements of
various difficulties and then asked to recite the statements to the proctor. In each trial, auditory,
visual, or a combination of auditory and visual distractors were either presented or not presented
at variable intervals and were randomly presented over intervals of 10 statements. The number
and type of distractors were modulated to assess the sustainment of attention and distractibility.
This study found that children with ADHD performed more poorly in terms of short-term recall
compared to the control group in the final two blocks of 10, however, distractor presentation
seemed to have a minimal effect on response accuracy. That is, those with ADHD only did
slightly more poorly than those without. Essentially, as the number of blocks increased,
performance in the ADHD group declined proportionally. These results may be attributable to
an increase in proactive interference. However, it should be noted that this study takes a novel
approach employing a methodology involving measuring the effect of unrelated distractors
(such as noise from the hallway) on recollection of learned statements rather than the
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Brown-Peterson task typically used in assessing proactive interference. Thus, the unique
approach to the proactive interference framework in this study renders a lack of illustration of
the effects of semantically similar items on impending recall. The author postulates that
depreciating performance accredited to the specific sensory distractors was insignificant
compared to the effect of accumulated proactive interference or item difficulty. The number and
the growing complexity of the items may prioritize long-term rather than short-term memory
processes (Higginbotham & Bartling, 1993).
The two main frameworks in which ADHD is considered are based on abnormalities in
either working memory or behavioral inhibition. Further, one of the most prominent
discrepancies between individuals with and without ADHD is seen regarding working memory
(Martinussen et al., 2005; Willcutt et al., 2005). The dual-component model of working memory
posits two independent components of primary (initial/implicit) memory maintenance and
secondary (retrieved) memory recall. Free visual and spatial free recall tasks revealed that in
individuals with ADHD, primary memory was intact while secondary memory seemed to be
deficient, though both types of memory were present for visual and auditory information
(Gibson et al., 2009). In replicating these findings, Raiker et al (2012) concluded that while
implicit memory is intact in individuals with ADHD, retrieval from memory processes may be
inadequate. It is therefore possible that the differences seen in those with ADHD may have
attributes in memory, consequently affecting proactive interference and performance (Raiker et
al., 2012).
In a study by White (2007), college students with and without ADHD (who had been
unmedicated for at least two weeks prior) were recruited to complete spatial and semantic
inhibition of return tasks in order to assess the effects of spatial and verbal proactive
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interference in individuals with ADHD. In the spatial inhibition of the return task, participants
were asked to indicate the target location from three possible locations as quickly and accurately
as possible, where one of the locations was primed just before that trial. The semantic inhibition
of return task was similarly set up, however, in this task, the prime location was marked by a
flashed word, followed by a distractor word that was semantically unrelated to the prime or
target. Subsequently, the target, semantically related or unrelated to the prime, was presented in
a location either congruent or incongruent to the prime as either a word or a nonword.
Participants were asked to indicate whether the stimulus was a word as quickly and accurately
as possible. The results showed a reduction in spatial proactive inhibition (i.e. inhibition of
return) but an increase in semantic proactive inhibition in those with ADHD (White, 2007).
Prior researchers have suggested that locational negative priming and spatial inhibition of return
may be one and the same. Both of these effects involve the emergence of inhibition when
attention is redirected to an identical stimulus that has previously been attended to (Chao & Yeh,
2006; Neill & Mathis, 1998; Posner et al., 1985). This conclusion indicates that ignoring a
distractor is not critical for negative priming to take place–in fact, some studies on negative
priming have shown that you can get negative priming when you attend to both targets and
distractors (MacDonald et al., 1999). The finding that individuals with ADHD may present
reduced proactive interference (i.e. inhibition of return) could potentially suggest that these
individuals may, by the same logic, display abnormal negative priming effects compared to
neurotypical individuals, however, the literature remains inconclusive. Prior researchers have
proposed that, though these paradigms are similar, inhibition of return relies on working
memory resources while location negative priming does not (Kahan et al., 2013). Such
inscrutability among the literature requires further studies to be done in support of such claims.
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The Current Study
The current study examines how memory impacts those with ADHD through assessing
the effects of proactive interference on individuals who have been previously diagnosed with
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. It is possible that if the reason that individuals with
ADHD get less negative priming is due to the fact that they are less likely to retrieve prior
episodes (i.e., they do not as readily retrieve the fact that they had ignored the item prior), then
it is possible that these individuals may also display differing levels of proactive interference
since this too is a memory-based effect that results from recently encountered stimuli. This is
because if people have difficulty retrieving items that were previously ignored, ergo past
episodes do not interfere as much with the current episodes, this may result in lower levels of
proactive interference. To test this hypothesis, participants in the first experiment both with and
without ADHD were assessed using a Brown-Peterson Task (Brown, 1958; Peterson &
Peterson, 1959) with words from semantically related categories. If those with ADHD have
difficulties with retrieving items from memory, it is thus possible that such individuals also
display abnormal levels of proactive interference (as that is a cognitive phenomenon based on
memory retrieval). Additionally, in the second experiment, a Flanker task was administered to
both groups of participants to assess negative priming effects (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974); in this
experiment, negative priming is expected to find deficient negative priming in those with
ADHD, and subsequently mirror the conclusions of past studies.
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Experiment 1a
Method
Participants
Fifty participants were recruited from Bates College, of all genders—female (54.17%),
male (41.67%), and nonbinary (4.17%)—between the ages of 18 and 22 with a mean age of
19.52 years old. This study was conducted with two groups of participants. Group one consisted
of those with an ADHD diagnosis or who show significant symptoms aligned with ADHD, and
group two included those without an ADHD diagnosis and those who do not show significant
symptoms. Of the participants, three self-reported that they had been previously diagnosed with
ADHD and the remaining 18 individuals were undiagnosed. In terms of CAARS scores, 10
individuals were categorized into the neurotypical group and 11 were assigned to the ADHD
group.
Materials
Necessary instruments for this study included a computer with an attached keyboard to
take the test and a quiet space without distractions.
The experimental tasks for all experiments were created and coded using the Open
Sesame interface (Mathôt et al., 2012) and distributed on the corresponding OS Web desktop
platform (Mathôt et al., 2012), using PsychoPy as the backend (Peirce, 2009). The studies were
exported by being embedded into a Qualtrics survey containing the initial consent form and the
concluding scales and remarks. The studies were hosted on and data were collected and stored
in a Jatos open-source server (Lange et al., 2015), and subsequently analyzed using SPSS
statistical analysis software as well as Microsoft Excel.
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A list of semantically related words, which participants were asked to remember and
later respond with when completing the experimental task, was obtained from a list of the
commonly known English words from 56 common categories of nouns from the literature
(Battig & Montague, 1969). The top 12 most common words were chosen from each of the 20
most common categories (see Appendix A).
Additionally, this investigation employed the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Assessment
(GAD-7; Omani-Samani et al., 2018; Spitzer et al., 2006) (see Appendix B). Anxiety is seen to
be positively correlated with the severity of ADHD symptoms; it is seen to exacerbate aspects
of ADHD pathology such as impulsivity and deficits in control (Brooker et al., 2020). The
GAD-7 is a seven-item measure of the severity of generalized anxiety disorder in an individual
in accordance with DSM-IV criteria. This scale asks participants to rate how often they have
been bothered by anxiety-related feelings or symptoms in the past two weeks on a Likert-based
scale indicating the frequency of symptoms from 0 “not at all” to 3 “nearly every day.” Scores
can range from 0 to 21 and may be interpreted such that scores from 0 to 4 indicate no or
minimal anxiety, 5 to 9 indicate mild anxiety, 10 to 14 indicate moderate anxiety, and 15 to 21
indicate severe anxiety.
Individuals were assessed on the presentation of symptoms indicative of ADHD using
the Conners’ Adult ADHD Rating Scales–Self-Report: Short Version (CAARS S:S; Adams et
al., 2020; Conners et al., 1999; see Appendix C). Participants were asked how much or how
frequently the following statements regarding behaviors or problems adults sometimes
experience described them recently. This measure is a Likert-based 26-item questionnaire with
responses ranging from 0 “not at all, never” to 3 “very much, very frequently.” The CAARS
S:S scale includes the four subscales of CAARS S:S A-Inattention/Memory Problems, CAARS
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S:S B-Hyperactivity/Restlessness, CAARS S:S C-Impulsivity/Emotional Lability, and CAARS
S:S D-Problems with Self-Concept, each containing 5 items, as well as a 12-item overall
CAARS S:S E ADHD Index.
Procedure
This study measured the accuracy of recall, as a function of the serial position of the
trial, in a list of given semantically related words. Prior to launching the study, participants were
presented with a consent form wherein they were informed that individuals with a diagnosis of
ADHD along with those who do not have this diagnosis are needed. They were informed that
those without an ADHD diagnosis or those who are diagnosed with ADHD but not medicated
should participate in the study in the morning before doing other tasks that day to control for the
variability of attention and mental fatigue throughout the day as well as to equate the time of
testing. Those who are taking medications for ADHD, primarily done in the morning, were
asked to participate in the study one hour before the time that they normally take their
medication, and then take their medication after. This was to control for the effect of treatment
medication which may skew results.
Participants were asked to have a computer with an attached keyboard and to find a
quiet space to complete this study. After signing a consent form and watching a brief
instructional video, they were then directed to the study which was presented digitally via
OSWeb. The experiment began by sequentially displaying three semantically related words at a
speed of one word per second. After viewing the words, participants were asked to count
backward by threes from a randomly chosen three-digit number four times to prevent rehearsal
of the items prior to the recall. Participants typed in the four values they calculated into the
displayed text box, separated by commas, and pressed the enter key to continue to the next trial.
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Then, the participants were asked to type in the words from the previously presented triplet into
a textbox, with commas between each word, and press the enter key when finished. They were
directed to spell the word correctly to the best of their ability. The semantically similar triplets
of words were presented in a series of four sets each from the same category (i.e., 12 words total
from the category). Each participant completed 20 of these series, and both groups of
participants were presented with the stimuli in the same order. The percent of words that were
accurately recalled were assessed as a function of the set number and participant
grouping–ADHD versus neurotypical.
After completing the OSWeb portion of the study, participants were redirected to a
Qualtrics survey in which they were given the GAD-7 to assess anxiety levels. Subsequently, as
many people may not have been diagnosed with ADHD but still present with manifestations of
the condition (Gray et al., 2014), the CAARS S:S was administered and responses were
recorded for the 26 items on the scale.
Participants were then asked to report whether they have ever received an ADHD
diagnosis. Those with ADHD were also asked to report their prescription and dose, as well as
their most recent intake of the medication. This information was not linked with participant
names or identificatory information so all information may remain entirely anonymous, in
concordance with HIPPA. Those without ADHD were also asked to report the same information
regarding whether they ever utilized medications typically used for ADHD recreationally.
Demographic information regarding gender, age, their highest level of education, and languages
in which they were fluent were also collected.
Results
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Word responses from the proactive interference study were first spell-checked and
corrected according to the suggested spelling in Microsoft Excel as well as Google Sheets. They
were then graded based on accuracy regardless of the order of the words presented. The percent
of correct words of the three words presented in each trial were averaged for each of the four
trials in a set for each participant.
CAARS responses from participants from Bates College were first analyzed by
calculating the sum of scores of CAARS items corresponding to the five different subscales
present within the CAARS ADHD scale. Due to technical difficulties, and the unfortunate
recent passing of the author, the scoring information customarily required to grade CAARS
responses proved to be quite difficult to obtain. Therefore, responses were assessed based on the
five CAARS subscales, which were used to categorize participants into their respective ADHD
or neurotypical groups. Of the subscales, the CAARS E ADHD Index was used to assign
participants to the ADHD or neurotypical group. A median split (Mdn = 51.82) was used to
separate the CAARS E scores into two groups where the higher scores were taken to indicate
ADHD and the lower scores were grouped as more likely neurotypical. The Cronbach α for
scale was .91, indicating high internal consistency.
GAD 7 responses were collected and responses from each item were summed. As
mentioned, individuals with scores between 0 and 4 were considered to have minimal anxiety,
scores from 5 to 9 indicated mild anxiety, 10 to 14 indicated moderate anxiety, and scores over
15 were seen to indicate severe anxiety. This had a Cronbach α of .93, indicating high internal
consistency.
Analyzing Groups by Self-Reported Clinical Diagnosis
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The data were initially analyzed by basic group membership on clinical diagnosis of
ADHD versus those who identified as neurotypical. A 4 (set number: 1, 2, 3, or 4) x 2 (clinical
diagnosis: diagnosed with ADHD or neurotypical) only found a significant main effect of the
set on response accuracy [F(3,57) = 6.81, p < .001]. Follow-up Fisher’s LSD tests revealed
performance in set 1 (M = 78.10%, SD = 2.19) was significantly better than in set 2 (M =
72.50%, SD = 2.10) or 4 (M = 71.20%, SD = 2.44), p = .004 and p < .001.
Analyzing Groups by Assessment on ASRS Survey
The data were analyzed by basic group membership on CAARS score indicating ADHD
versus those who identified as neurotypical. A 4 (set number: 1, 2, 3, or 4) x 2 (CAARS
categorization: ADHD or neurotypical) analysis of variance (ANOVA) regarding performance
over the four trials showed a main effect of trial number within each set of categorically related
four trials [F(3,57) = 7.70, p < .001]. Follow-up Fisher’s LSD tests revealed performance in set
1 (M = 77.80%, SD = 4.70) was significantly different than in set 2 (M = 72.40%, SD = 4.60) or
4 (M = 70.90, SD = 5.30), p = .001 for both, and set 3 (M = 75.00%, SD = 4.60) was also
significantly different from set 4 (M = 70.90%, SD = 5.30), p = .010. Set 1 and 2 were not
significantly different, neither were set 2 and 3 or set 1 and 3. No significant main effect of
clinical diagnosis [F(1,19) = 1.01, p = .329], or interaction between clinical diagnosis and trial
number [F(3,57) = 1.79, p = .159] was found.
Discussion
There were several limitations of Experiment 1a which make the interpretation of the
findings questionable. After data collection, the CAARS scoring manual was unfortunately
unattainable, due to the recent passing of the author and limited time and resources–that is, the
official purchasing of the test materials were quite expensive and needed additional resources
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for scoring which were not readily available for use or easily obtained. Furthermore, the
publication services were not understanding of undergraduate use of said measure and the lack
of qualification. Additionally, the order of which words appeared in which set was not random,
so perhaps easier words to remember just happened to be shown in the third set, which was
shown to have accuracy similar to sets 1 and 2 (i.e., proactive interference did not increase
linearly across sets). Finally, the example words in the instructional video were part of the
experimental task stimuli, and thus participants saw those items twice during the study.
Experiment 1b was conducted to fix the problems of Experiment 1a. Specifically, a more
conclusive ADHD assessment was used–the Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS) v1.1
(Kessler et al., 2005). This assessment was chosen as it is a comparably efficient assessment of
ADHD yet much more simple to analyze than the CAARS. Also, the item sequence within each
category, as well as the order of the categories themselves, was randomized across sets, and the
words and categories which appeared in the instructional video were replaced with equal
common replacements obtained from the same source as before (Battig & Montague, 1969). In
other words, the categories of words were randomized in the order in which they were
presented, and the words themselves within each category were additionally randomized. Lastly,
because it was difficult to obtain enough participants who self-reported an ADHD diagnosis at
Bates College, a new sample was obtained from an online crowdsourcing website.
Experiment 1b
Methods
Participants
In this experiment, 52 participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk of
ages ranging from 21 to 66 (M = 34.94, SD = 1.32) including 30 women (57.7%), 20 men
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(38.5%), and two individuals identifying as non-binary (3.8%). These participants were evenly
distributed with 26 participants who self-reported as having been previously diagnosed with
ADHD and 26 participants who had never received an ADHD diagnosis. ADHD and
neurotypical identifying participants were recruited separately and simultaneously. In addition
to reported ADHD diagnoses received, presentation of ADHD symptoms were assessed using
the ASRS v1.1. A majority of the participants had completed some level of higher education
(56%), with some who completed some college (16%), and most others completing high school
or some GED-equivalent (28%). All participants were proficient in English.
Materials
The necessary materials required for this study are the same as that for Experiment 1a,
however, the Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS) v1.1 (see Appendix D), was used rather
than the CAARS ADHD scale to assess the extent of ADHD symptoms displayed by
participants.
The ASRS v1.1 is an 18-item scale composed of DSM-IV-TR criteria, six of which are
seen to be predictive of symptoms synonymous with ADHD (Kessler et al., 2005). Individuals
with four or more shaded boxes (as indicated on the scale) within those six items were
considered to have symptoms consistent with ADHD with 68.7% sensitivity and 99.5%
accuracy. Additionally, the items are categorized into two subscales indicating a preeminence of
hyperactivity and inattention symptoms within an individual which are scored out of a total
score of 36 for each respective subscale (Georgiopoulos et al., 2018). The Cronbach α for scale
was .91, indicating high internal consistency.
The experimental task, presented using Open Sesame and Jatos as before, was nearly
identical to Experiment 1a. The task was the same except in this portion of the experiment, the
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order of the words within each category as well as the categories themselves were randomized.
This was to ensure that there was no residual effect of word complexity on participants’
responses. Additionally, the first category of words, which was briefly shown during an
instructional video that the participants were required to watch prior to beginning the
experiment, was exchanged for a different category of words obtained from the same list (see
Appendix E) which was not in the experimental trials. This was to ensure there was no effect of
the word repetition on the collected responses.
Procedure
The procedure was repeated in the same manner as done in Experiment 1a, except this
time the ASRS v1.1 was used to assess ADHD rather than the CAARS.
Results
Word responses and GAD-7 scores were assessed identically to Experiment 1a. The
Cronbach α for scale was .96, indicating high internal consistency. ASRS responses collected
from each participant were first quantified for the number of shaded boxes, as indicated on the
scale, and were marked in the first six items on the ADHD self-assessment (with a Cronbach α
of .96, indicating high internal consistency). Additionally, the scores from all the items were
summed in aggregate and individually based on the two independent ADHD subscales present
in the ASRS (attention and hyperactivity).
Analyzing Groups by Self-Reported Clinical Diagnosis
The data were first analyzed by basic group membership on self-reported clinical
diagnosis of ADHD versus those who identified as neurotypical. A 4 (serial trial number in a
set: 1, 2, 3, or 4) x 2 (clinical diagnosis: diagnosed with ADHD or neurotypical) ANOVA on
response accuracy across the four trials in each set revealed no significant interaction between
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trial number and clinical diagnosis [F(3, 147), = .403, p = .751] and no significant main effect
of clinical diagnosis [F(3, 147) = .31, p = .580]. A significant main effect of trial number within
a set was found on response accuracy, F(3, 147) = 4.41, p = .005. Fisher’s LSD post hoc tests
revealed performance across trial 1 (M = 92.96%, SD = 1.60) was significantly higher than in
trial 3 (M = 91.26%, SD = 1.60; p = .045) and 4 (M = 90.18%, SD = 1.59; p < .001), , and
accuracy on trials 2 (M = 91.92%, SD = 1.37) was significantly higher than trials 3 (M =
91.26%, SD = 1.60; p = .022) . No significant difference was found between trials 2 and trials 1
or 3.
A Bayesian analysis was calculated to quantify the evidence in favor of the null
hypothesis compared to other alternative hypotheses (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; Masson, 2011;
Wagenmakers, 2007). This was conducted using the Jeffreys's Amazing Statistics Program
(JASP) software (JASP Team, 2018), according to Wagenmakers et al. (2007) (see Table 1). The
BF10 column indicates that the data best supports the model that includes only a main effect of
trial number; the data are 5.73 times more likely to result under this model compared to the null
hypothesis (BF10 = 5.73). In addition, a model with two main effects and an interaction is
20.46 times less likely than the model with a main effect of trial number (5.73/.28=20.46).
Analyzing Groups by Assessment on ASRS Survey
The data were then analyzed by basic group membership on ASRS scores indicating
ADHD versus those who identified as neurotypical. There was a high overlap between
self-reported diagnosis and assessment based on ASRS scores. However, the correspondence
was not perfect: 6 of the 26 participants identifying as neurotypical were assigned to the ADHD
group by their responses on the ASRS, and 5 of the 26 participants self-reporting being
diagnosed with ADHD were categorized as neurotypical based on their ASRS responses . Thus,
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in my analysis, there were 27 participants in the ADHD group and 25 participants in the
neurotypical group, as per the ASRS. The analyses were recalculated based on the ASRS
assessment, which has been shown to be an equivalently valid measure of ADHD
(Georgiopoulos et al., 2018; Kessler et al., 2005).
A 4 (serial trial number in a set: 1, 2, 3, or 4) x 2 (ASRS categorization: ADHD,
neurotypical) ANOVA showed a significant main effect of set on response accuracy across the
four trials, F(3,147) = 4.41, p = 0.005 (Figure 1). Pairwise comparisons using Fisher' LSD
showed accuracy in both groups in trial 1 (M = 93.04%, SD = 1.52) was significantly higher
than that in trials 3 (M = 91.32%, SD = 1.50, p = .045) or 4 (M = 90.24%, SD = 1.51, p <.001,
and accuracy in trial 2 (M = 91.96%, SD = 1.31) was significantly higher than in trial 4 (M =
90.24%, SD = 1.51, p = .023). There was also a main effect of diagnosis, F(1,49) = 6.49, p
<.001. Those categorized by their ASRS scores showing symptoms of ADHD tended to
generally score lower (M = 88.13%, SD = 1.93) compared to those categorized as neurotypical
(M = 95.15%, SD = 1.97). Parallel to the effects seen with the clinical neurological diagnoses,
no interaction was found between set and group, F(3,147) = .37, p = .776.
A Bayesian analysis was again calculated to quantify the evidence in favor of the null
hypothesis compared to other alternative hypotheses (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; Masson, 2011;
Wagenmakers, 2007). The BF10 column indicates that the data best supports the model that
includes a main effect of trial number and ASRS categorization; the data are 18.59 times more
likely to result under this model compared to the null hypothesis (BF10 = 18.59).
Given this, however, a major determinant of the ambiguity in past studies is proposed to
be due to failure to consider the different subtypes of ADHD and the effects of stimulant
medications (Shin, 2005). The subtypes of ADHD may entail different mechanisms behind the
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cognitive processing deficiencies present in such individuals, therefore, the participant ASRS
responses were used to sort participants into four different groups: combined-ADHD,
inattentive-ADHD, hyperactive-ADHD, and neurotypical. Additionally, this data were covaried
with whether or not the participant had taken stimulant medications as they have been seen to
reduce the reaction time variability in those with ADHD (Shahar et al, 2016). Furthermore,
comorbidity of ADHD with anxiety symptoms has also been shown to have a significant impact
on the performance of individuals with ADHD in such tasks, and thus was additionally assessed
as a covariate (Pritchard et al., 2008).
No participants had more than five of the critical boxes marked in the ASRS questions
indicating hyperactivity dominant ADHD, however, 21 individuals marked over five of the
critical boxes for the ASRS items indicating inattentive ADHD, and 9 individuals showed both
indicating combined-ADHD. A 4 (serial trial number in a set: 1, 2, 3, or 4) x 3 (ASRS
categorization: neurotypical, inattentive ADHD, combined ADHD) showed main effects of set
[F(3,144), = 5.82, p = <.001] and of ASRS categorization [F(2,48), = 3.33, p = .044]. Post hoc
tests showed accuracy in both groups in trial 1 (M = 93.04%, SD = 1.52) was significantly
higher than that in trials 3 (M = 91.32%, SD = 1.50, p = .045) or 4 (M = 90.24%, SD = 1.51;
further, neurotypical individuals were seen to perform the best (M = 94.37%, SD = 7.17, p =
.297), followed by those with inattentive ADHD (M = 89.27%, SD = 11.12, p = .051), with the
combined ADHD group doing the worst (M = 85.28%, SD = 17.23, p = .635). However, there
was no interaction found between the set number and ASRS categorization [F(3,144), = 1.36, p
= .233]. This was maintained when covaried with medication [set: F(3,141), = 4.57, p = .004;
group: F(2,47), = 4.52, p = .016; F(6,141), = 1.76, p = .112]. However, when covaried with
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anxiety, all significant main effects disappeared [set: F(3,141), = 2.05, p = .110; group: F(2,47),
= 1.05, p = .356; interaction: F(6,141), = 1.14, p = .345].
A Pearson’s r showed that there was a significant negative correlation between average
performance over the four trials within a set and GAD-7 scores, indicating anxiety level, r(49) =
-.36, p = .01 (two-tailed), as well as with the number of shaded boxes marked in the critical first
six items of the ASRS scale r(49) = -.34, p = .02 (two-tailed), the number of shaded boxes on
ASRS items indicating inattention, r(49) = -.37, p = .01 (two-tailed), hyperactivity, r(49) = -.35,
p = .01 (two-tailed), and aggregate ASRS scores, r(49) = -.38, p = .01 (two-tailed).
Discussion
Past research exploring differences in proactive interference and ADHD has presented
rather inscrutable findings. This study aimed to investigate the differences in cognitive
processing between individuals with and without ADHD specifically regarding differences in
negative priming and proactive interference. Supposing that individuals with ADHD exceed
neurotypical individuals in retrieving previously ignored items from memory, in this study I
evaluated whether those with ADHD may also display abnormal levels of proactive
interference–as that may also be attributed to a memory phenomenon. To evaluate this,
proactive interference was measured with a Brown-Peterson task, in which I expected to see an
interaction where proactive interference differed for the two groups, similarly to findings seen
in other studies (Egeland et al., 2010; White, 2007). Additionally, performance was expected to
decrease across the trials in each set to indicate effective proactive interference as the initial
trials in the set interfere with the recent ones.
In both Experiments 1a and b performance accuracy on the first set of each category was
significantly better than that on the last set of each category. The drop in accuracy over
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subsequent trials suggests an apparent effect of proactive interference, as expected. The
semantically related information from the former trials was being confused in memory with
more recent information from the later trials, causing decreased recall accuracy as the trials
progressed. This ensured that performance in the Brown-Peterson task arrangement in this study
effectively reflected proactive interference levels across all individuals. Similarly, performance
was also affected by group categorization where those with ADHD generally performed worse
than those without, when group categorization was based on the ASRS. In terms of ADHD
symptoms, greater indications of ADHD and anxiety were associated with worse performance
in terms of response accuracy. This can suggest the deficiencies associated with ADHD and
anxiety disorders are related in some capacity to proactive interference or its mechanisms.
Contrary to my hypothesis, however, those with ADHD, regardless of where participants were
recruited from, did not display a significantly different increase in proactive interference than
controls. This finding contradicts the conclusion from past studies, which have found
differences in proactive interference (Egeland et al., 2020; White, 2007), though those studies
did not measure proactive interference in a traditional Brown-Peterson task.
Conducting a Bayesian analysis showed that a model including a main effect of both set
and ADHD category is indeed the best fit for the data collected (being nearly 20 times more
likely than the null hypothesis and higher than the likelihood of other potential models). This
indicates that performance was seen to be significantly different as a factor of the trial number
in each set and the ADHD group of the participant. Contrary to my predictions, participants did
not show a difference in proactive interference between the ADHD and control groups
Further, accounting for ADHD again according to the ASRS subscale scores reflected
the same pattern of significance. There was no change in significant effects with the additional
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covariate of ADHD medication. However, when anxiety was added as a covariate, all
significance was lost. This indicates that the difference observed between the groups was an
effect of anxiety symptoms rather than reflecting differences due to ADHD symptoms. This
further emphasized that the performance differences between the groups may not be due to
ADHD deficits but might be due to anxiety symptoms of those who had the additional
comorbidity.
In essence, this showed proactive interference was intact among those with and without
ADHD deficits–regardless of how the analysis was conducted. As the trials progressed within a
set and more semantically similar items were added, performance in both groups declined.
These findings, however, contradict past research where those with inattentive ADHD
performed worse than the controls, and the combined-ADHD groups showed proactive
interference to be nonexistent (Egeland et al., 2020). In my study, those with combined ADHD
had the worst performance (i.e., greatest proactive interference). It should be considered that in
the study conducted by England et al. (2020) the target recall items were encoded at a far deeper
level. The target list of words was rehearsed multiple times prior to the presentation of the
distractor and recall task and ergo processed into long-term memory. By contrast, my study only
required participants to hold the items in short-term memory prior to recall and were thus
cognitively processed at a much lower level. Proactive interference has been considered by
some to be the consequence of deep-level encoding (Egeland et al., 2020), and therefore it is
possible that the level of encoding evoked in my study was not adequate enough to be sensitive
to proactive interference differences in those with and without ADHD. As such, the reasoning
behind these oppositional findings continues to remain uncertain, nevertheless, it is possible that
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the level of processing plays a role in the distinction and will require further investigation
before any conclusions may be drawn.
It is also possible, however, that the factors of sensory modality and/or distractor-target
congruence are responsible for these contradictions. Studies that concluded negative priming
discrepancies among the ADHD and non-ADHD groups also involved other presentation or
response modalities which may justify the similarity in proactive interference observed in my
study (Egeland et al., 2020; Higginbotham & Bartling, 1993; White, 2007). The study by
Egeland et al. (2020) involved oral presentation and rehearsal of the words; Higginbotham and
Bartling (1993) presented sentences orally for participants to verbally recall; White (2007) saw
a significant decrease in proactive interference in only the spatial domain, and a significant
increase in the semantic domain, indicative of the fact that the mechanisms behind proactive
interference across the two domains are related but independent of one another. Hence, it is
possible that though semantic proactive interference is the same among the two groups, there
are significant differences in proactive interference lie in other domains; however, further
studies are necessary to examine whether modality affects proactive interference levels in those
with ADHD. It should be further noted that these studies employed very different
methodologies from my own and therefore are targeting different underlying cognitive
mechanisms and producing different results.
It had been predicted that if the reason prior studies found that individuals with ADHD
have shown less negative priming is caused by episodic retrieval issues, then these individuals
might exhibit less proactive interference since this too is a memory-based effect that results
from retrieving prior information. However, the results of Experiment 1 showed that proactive
interference, as assessed using a Brown-Peterson task, was not diminished in the ADHD group.
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Perhaps the reason for this discrepancy is that the reduced negative priming seen in those with
ADHD may be dependent on ignoring distracting information (Frings, 2015), whereas
distracting information is not part of a Brown-Peterson task. If distraction is important, then
participants with ADHD should still exhibit reduced negative priming compared to controls,
even if they show the same amount of PI. Because the negative priming findings with a Stroop
task have not always shown group differences (Gaultney et al., 1999; Pritchard et al., 2006),
Experiment 2 used a flanker (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) task modeled after Ossmann and
Mulligan’s (2003) study with ADHD and control groups, though the task was changed from
pronunciation to keypress to facilitate online data collection.
Experiment 2
Methods
Participants
Participants (N = 52) were once again recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk in a
congruent manner to Experiment 1b. Participants included 30 men (57.69%), 21 women
(40.39%) and 1 nonbinary (1.92%). In terms of clinical diagnosis, 27 participants reported being
diagnosed with ADHD, and 25 reported being neurotypical.
Materials
The required materials for this portion of the experiment were nearly identical to that
needed in Experiment 1b. Participants from MTurk were administered the ASRS v1.1 (with a
Cronbach α of .96, indicating high internal consistency) to assess ADHD symptoms and GAD-7
(with a Cronbach α of .96, indicating high internal consistency) to indicate anxiety levels. The
study was presented in Qualtrics with an embedded Open Sesame study, just as before,
however, in this case, a flanker task was administered rather than a Brown-Peterson task.
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Procedure
A flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) was administered in which the words stone,
clock, match, and label were randomly displayed in 40-point Arial bold font and all capital
letters in pairs. One of the words in the pair was presented in red pixels on the display screen
and the other was presented in green pixels, centered horizontally with one word placed 20
pixels above the center and the other 20 pixels below. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of two conditions where either the green pixels signified a target word and the red pixelated
word in the pair signified the distractor word or vice versa (where the red pixel word was the
target and the green pixel word was the distractor). Each word was paired equally often with
every other word, in each location (top or bottom), and in each color. Participants were asked to
respond to the target word by indicating its identity using the S, C, M, or L keyboard keys for
stone, clock, match, and label, respectively, as quickly and accurately as possible. Participants
completed 6 practice trials in addition to 288 experimental trials. After completing the flanker
task, participants were directed back to the Qualtrics survey, where they responded to the same
questionnaire items as Experiment 1b.
Results
Responses were graded based on accuracy in the control and ignored repetition
conditions. Accuracy rates and response times across the ADHD and neurotypical groups were
assessed in the two conditions. ADHD and neurotypical categorization according to the ASRS
and assessment of anxiety symptoms with the GAD-7 were assessed as done before in part 1 of
this study. Geometric means were used to reduce the effects of outliers on the reaction time
data.
Analyzing Groups by Self-Reported Clinical Diagnosis
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The data were initially analyzed by the participant’s reported diagnosis indicating
ADHD versus those who identified as neurotypical. A 2 (clinical diagnosis: ADHD or
neurotypical) x 2 (trial condition: control or ignored repetition) mixed ANOVA conducted on
response accuracy showed no significant effect of negative priming [F(1,50) = .63, p = .432],
diagnosis [F(1,50) = 1.75, p = .169], or interaction between the two [F(1,50) = .09, p = .771].
For reaction times, a 2 (clinical diagnosis: ADHD, neurotypical) x 2 (trial condition:
control, ignored repetition) mixed ANOVA again showed no significant effect of negative
priming [F(1,50) = 2.94, p = .093], diagnosis [F(1,50) = 3.00, p = .089], or interaction [F(1,50)
= .03, p = .858].
Analyzing Groups by Assessment on ASRS Survey
The data were next analyzed by basic group membership on ASRS scores indicating
ADHD versus those who identified as neurotypical. Again, there was an imperfect overlap
between self-reported diagnosis and assessment based on ASRS scores: 6 of the 26 participants
identifying as neurotypical were also assigned to the ADHD group based on ASRS responses,
and 5 of 26 participants identifying as having ADHD were assigned to the neurotypical group
based on ASRS responses. As such, in my analysis, there were 18 participants in the ADHD
group and 34 participants in the neurotypical group. A 2 (ASRS categorization: ADHD or
neurotypical) x 2 (trial condition: control or ignored repetition) mixed ANOVA conducted on
response accuracy showed no significant interaction between negative priming displayed and
ASRS categorization [F(1,50) = .62, p = .435], and no significant main effect of negative
priming [F(1,50) = 1.02, p = .317]. However, there was a significant main effect of ASRS
categorization [F(1,50) = 12.15, p = .001]. The means are displayed in Figure 2. When covaried
with GAD-7 anxiety scores no change in significance was seen. There was still no significant
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interaction, [F(1,50) = 1.86, p = .178], or main effect of negative priming, [F(1,50) = 2.79, p =
.101] and there was a significant main effect of ASRS categorization, [F(1,50) = 11.04, p =
.002].
A 2 (ASRS categorization: ADHD or neurotypical) x 2 (trial condition: control or
ignored repetition) mixed ANOVA conducted on reaction times similarly showed no significant
interaction between ASRS categorization and negative priming [F(1,50) = .17, p = .683], and no
significant main effect of negative priming [F(1,50) = 2.29, p = .136], though there was a
marginally significant main effect of ASRS categorization, [F(1,50) = 3.76, p = .058]. The
means are displayed in Figure 3. When covaried with GAD-7 scores, all significance was
eradicated; that is, there was no significant main effect of negative priming [F(1,49) = .08, p =
.778], or ASRS categorization [F(1,49) = .13, p = .725], and there was no significant interaction
between the two, [F(1,49) = .53, p = .470].
As my predictions for this study specifically related to negative priming being apparent
in the neurotypical group but not the ADHD group, even though no significant interaction was
seen, separate t-tests were conducted on each respective group to independently observe the
effects of negative priming. A paired samples t-test revealed that reaction times for neurotypical
individuals was significantly lower in the control condition (M = 718 , SD = 143.08) as
compared to the ignored repetition condition (M = 729, SD = 154.29), t(33) = -2.10, p = .043
(two-tailed). However, a paired samples t-test revealed for individuals with ADHD revealed
reaction times for the controlled condition (M = 816, SD = 214.46) were not significantly
different from the ignored repetition condition (M = 823, SD = 199.02), t(17) = -.51, p = .307
(two-tailed).
Discussion
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Past studies have shown individuals with ADHD may display reduced negative priming
(Christiansen & Oades, 2010; Curatolo et al., 2010; Gaultney et al., 1999; Gilden, 2001; Keppel
& Underwood, 1962; Marriott, 1998; Mclaughlin, 2003; Ossman & Mulligan, 2003; Pritchard et
al., 2006; Pritchard et al., 2008; Shin, 2005; Shin, 2006; Storm & White 2010; White, 2007). As
such, in my study, individuals with ADHD were expected to present lower levels of negative
priming relative to the neurotypical controls.
Results from the negative priming task in terms of response accuracy showed there was
no effect of the negative priming condition and there was a significant difference in
performance based on participant group categorized by ASRS scores. This means that though I
did not see a significant negative priming effect in the ANOVA, neurotypical individuals still
had significantly more accurate responses overall compared to those with ADHD. This effect
maintained significance even when anxiety was added as a covariate, supporting the conclusion
that these results were indeed a result of ADHD symptoms rather than a confounding effect
from anxiety. Opposingly, when reaction times were assessed, again only ASRS group had a
significant effect, however, this significance was eradicated when anxiety was added as a
covariate. This suggests that the disparity in reaction times between the two groups may be
attributable to anxiety rather than being an effect of ADHD.
Even though no significant interaction was observed between ASRS categorization and
negative priming, further investigation into this relationship showed that when the two groups
are analyzed independently, neurotypical individuals do display a significant negative priming
effect while those with ADHD do not. It is possible that this juxtaposition in findings is a power
issue within the statistical analysis itself. Essentially this shows that negative priming
differences between those with and without ADHD remain elusive.
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General Discussion
Results from Experiment 1 clearly demonstrate that the ASRS was effective in
identifying individuals who differ on ADHD symptomatology, as evidenced by the fact that the
two groups differed on overall accuracy levels. In addition, the methodological design used here
allowed me to replicate proactive interference as both groups performed significantly worse on
later trials within a semantic category compared to earlier trials. However, the data also clearly
indicate that the amount of proactive interference does not differ significantly across these two
groups of participants. Equivalence in proactive interference was supported by a Bayesian
analysis. As such, if there is a difference in the amount of negative priming exhibited by these
two groups, as some prior studies have found, then the mechanism responsible for that is not the
same mechanism that causes proactive interference. This possibility is consistent with the idea
that negative priming is caused by inhibition rather than memory retrieval, or if it is caused by
memory retrieval, it is caused by a different memory mechanism. However, another possibility
is that prior reports of differences in negative priming are spurious and not replicable. Data from
Experiment 2 are inconclusive on this point. On the one hand, the interaction between negative
priming and group failed to reach significance. On the other hand, the pattern of data is going in
the right direction, and the individual t-tests support the idea that the reduction in negative
priming might replicate. Future research should continue to examine negative priming in
ADHD. I would recommend using a flanker task with a pronunciation task rather than keypress,
and a larger sample size. Overall, what has been learned is that these two groups do not differ on
proactive interference.
One interesting finding regarding the classification of ADHD across all three studies
was the reasoning behind the differing effects among the analyses conducted with the ASRS
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categories vs. those with a self-identified diagnosis is uncertain. It is possible that those who
have been diagnosed with ADHD may no longer exhibit symptoms as they might have prior to
receiving any treatment (such as therapy or medication), ergo leading them to no longer be
characterized as having ADHD by the ASRS assessment. Similarly, it is likely that some of
those who identified as neurotypical yet are characterized as having ADHD by the ASRS have
simply not been officially diagnosed. Therefore, perhaps the ASRS categorization more aptly
captures those who currently have symptoms of ADHD and those who do not, though further
investigation into this difference is needed before any conclusions may be reached.
This statistical pattern of effects is mirrored in multiple studies in the past regarding
negative priming and ADHD (Hasher et al., 1991; Ossmann & Mulligan, 2003). The current
study tenuously found a reduction in negative priming for individuals with ADHD using a
flanker task. Given that prior experiments have not always found this reduction in negative
priming, and the marginal nature of the results found here, the current study further adds to the
elusive nature of this group difference. Future research should examine whether these
inconsistent results are affected by the interstimulus interval during the negative priming task
(see Shin, 2006; Tipper 1987) or ADHD subtypes (see Shin, 2005).
These findings may be considered as support towards Barkley’s (1997) Inhibition
Theory of ADHD. In the proactive interference study, though I saw no difference in proactive
interference effects, those with ADHD showed worse performance on the short-term recall task
overall. According to the Inhibition Theory, those with ADHD display insufficient inhibitory
processes, which would suggest perhaps that those with ADHD are worse at inhibiting other
distractors unrelated to the task (such as environmental distractors or wandering thoughts). This
in turn may cause a decrease in accuracy overall compared to a neurotypical group. Similarly, in
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the negative priming study, if those with ADHD are insufficient at inhibiting, they may have an
easier time responding to the ignored repetition trials. The tenuous lack of negative priming in
those with ADHD may be because the mental representation of the previously ignored distractor
is not being adequately inhibited in the current trial which means that those with ADHD can
respond to them quicker, as opposed to neurotypical individuals who are inhibiting the distractor
interfering with them executing the appropriate response as efficiently as the ADHD group. If
inhibition is the problem, the findings of the current study suggest that ADHD deficits may be a
consequence of inadequate inhibitory processes, supporting Barkley’s Theory of ADHD. Of
course there's still the possibility that the marginal reduction in negative priming for the ADHD
group is due to memory retrieval issues that are operating differently when effort is put into
retrieving something, like in the proactive interference study, as opposed to the negative priming
study where the aim is not to retrieve the distractor identity. This explanation doesn't seem
related to Barkley's theory.
The current study adds to the growing literature regarding the underlying mechanism of
negative priming and illustrates the specificities involved with ADHD. Going forward, this area
of study will of course require more research as psychologists continue to learn more about the
field and how memory works. Further research may involve investigating things like cognitive
differences in individuals with ADHD on and off stimulant medications, the effects of task
selection on negative priming levels (such as using the Stroop task versus the flanker task), as
well as the suggestions mentioned earlier in this thesis. Additionally, further studies involving
the addition of physiological assessments (such as EEG or fMRI data) can help provide a more
comprehensive picture of the differences in those with ADHD, especially as many of the
theories behind ADHD as well as the cognitive effects examined (i.e., proactive interference
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and negative priming) are associated with brain regions. It would also be of interest to study
whether there are any parallel effects seen regarding proactive interference levels in other
populations implicated to have reduced negative priming, namely: schizophrenics (Park et al.,
1996), schizotypals (Albertella et al., 2016), individuals with high cognitive failures (Tipper &
Baylis, 1987), individuals with low Tellegen absorption (Campbell & Raz, 2012), individuals
with low working memory (Ortells et al., 2016), children (Viarouge et al., 2019), elderly not
tested in the morning (Hsu et al., 1997), and regular marijuana users (Albertella et al., 2016).
Limitations
One limitation of this study is the method of data collection. As the data were all
collected online, participants were required to respond to the task via keypress. This meant that
participants were not able to pronounce task items; a method that has been employed in past
studies (Egeland et al., 2020; Higginbotham & Bartling, 1993). It is possible that this leads to
greater variability within the results than would be in vocal response times in a lab. This may
lead to the unreliability within the data and thus inaccuracies in the results.
Another potential limitation of this study was the lack of assessment of working
memory. Though working memory deficits are not intrinsic to ADHD impairments, it has been
postulated that those with ADHD have many deficits in working memory, particularly in terms
of the central executive function (Kofler et al., 2020). Working memory also seems to be
responsible for many of the cognitive abnormalities of individuals with ADHD (Bunge et al.,
2001; Kane & Engle, 2000; Kasper et al., 2012; Postle & Brush, 2004). Further, those with
greater working memory capacities are seen to be more susceptible to the effects of proactive
interference (Rosen & Engle, 1997); individual differences in working memory load and
capacity are seen to be modulators of negative priming effects (Pritchard et al., 2008). As such,
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it is possible that the decreased accuracy of the ADHD group observed in the current study may
be an effect of individual differences in working memory among these individuals rather than
fully being a retrieval or inhibition issue. Given this, future research regarding differences in
proactive interference and negative priming in those with ADHD should be conducted with the
added consideration of working memory capacity.
Intelligence has also been seen to have a wide range of effects on multiple aspects of
cognition such as recall, inhibition, and working memory capacity (Egeland et al., 2010).
Disparities in IQ and working memory, therefore, may lead to findings that do not
independently reflect ADHD deficits. Learning disabilities were also unaccounted for in this
study and may have consequences on the ability of participants to rapidly read and store the
stimuli information. This can in turn skew response accuracy in tasks such as the
Brown-Petterson task. And lastly, age was inadvertently not assessed among participants who
were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk in experiment 2, which can also have an effect
on baseline cognitive performance. Given this, it is recommended that future research controls
for IQ, participant age, and learning disorders in order to more clearly understand the potential
cognitive differences in memory in those with ADHD.
Conclusion
Though the specific mechanisms remain inconclusive, those with ADHD do indeed
exhibit differences in memory in some capacity compared to neurotypical people. The current
study proposes that the cognitive mechanisms behind proactive interference and negative
priming are indeed distinct. This possibly suggests that negative priming may not be a
complication with memory retrieval, or if it is caused by memory retrieval, it is caused by a
different memory mechanism, though further evidence is necessary before any such claims can
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be made. It is recommended that future research be conducted while controlling for individual
differences in working memory, IQ, age, and other potential disabilities as well as assessing
additional factors like presentation modalities and different interstimulus intervals. The current
study and future research give psychologists a better understanding of the inner workings of
memory and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorders. This research will provide a deeper
understanding of inhibition and recall processes in memory, and how they may differ among
individuals.
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Table 1
JASP Output for the Bayesian ANOVA for Proactive Interference Grouped by ASRS Scores for
Experiment 1b.

Model Comparison

Models

P(M)

P(M|data)

BFM

BF10

Null model (incl. subject)

0.200

Set Number + Grouping Based on
ASRS

0.033

0.138

1.000

0.200

0.619

6.489

18.587

6.609

Set Number

0.200

0.188

0.927

5.654

0.755

Grouping Based on ASRS

0.200

0.115

0.520

3.455

6.833

Set Number + Grouping Based on
ASRS + Set Number ✻ Grouping
Based on ASRS

0.200

0.045

0.188

1.348

2.742

Note. All models include subject

error %
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Figure 1
Accuracy Rates Across the Four Sets within each Trial of Semantically Related Items for
Individuals with ADHD and Neurotypical Individuals as Designated with the ASRS in
Experiment 1a. Error Bars Represent 95% Confidence Intervals.
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Figure 2
Accuracy Rates in the Control Condition and Ignored Repetition (IR) Condition for Individuals
with ADHD and Neurotypical Individuals as Designated with the ASRS in Experiment 2. Error
Bars Represent 95% Confidence Intervals.
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Figure 3
Response Times in the Control Condition and Ignored Repetition (IR) Condition for Individuals
with ADHD and Neurotypical Individuals as Designated with the ASRS in Experiment 2. Error
Bars Represent 95% Confidence Intervals.
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Appendix A
Stimuli presented in Brown-Peterson Task in Experiment 1a
A precious stone: diamond, ruby, emerald, sapphire, pearl, opal, jade, topaz, amethyst, onyx,
garnet, turquoise
A unit of time: hour, minute, second, year, day, century, month, decade, week, millisecond, eon,
era
A relative: aunt, uncle, father, mother, brother, sister, cousin, grandmother, grandfather, nephew,
niece, husband
A unit of distance: mile, foot, inch, yard, meter, centimeter, kilometer, millimeter, rod,
light-year, decimeter, block
A metal: iron, copper, steel, gold, aluminum, silver, tin, zinc, brass, lead, bronze, magnesium
A type of reading material: magazine, book, newspaper, pamphlet, novel, textbook, paper,
comic book, short story, journal, brochure, letter
A military title: lieutenant, general, sergeant, private, captain, colonel, major, corporal, admiral,
commander, ensign, colonel
A four-footed animal: dog, cat, horse, cow, lion, tiger, elephant, pig, bear, mouse, rat, deer
A kind of cloth: cotton, wool, silk, rayon, nylon, dacron, linen, satin, orlon, madras, velvet,
burlap
A color: blue, red, green, yellow, cyan, black, purple, white, pink, brown, violet, gray
A kitchen utensil: knife, spoon, fork, pan, pot, spatula, can-opener, stove, bowl, mixer, cup, dish
A building for religious services: church, synagogue, temple, chapel, cathedral, mosque, shrine,
monastery, tabernacle, pagoda, sanctuary, basilica
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A part of speech: noun, adjective, pronoun, verb, adverb, conjunction, preposition, interjection,
participle, gerund, words, article
An article of furniture: chair, table, bed, sofa, desk, lamp, couch, dresser, television, stool,
bureau, rug
A part of the human body: legs, arms, head, eye, chin, nose, finger, ear, hand, toe, mouth,
stomach
A fruit: apple, orange, pear, banana, peach, grape, cherry, plum, grapefruit, lemon, tangerine,
apricot
A weapon: bayonet, gun, rifle, bomb, club, sword, arrow, pistol, rope, cannon, spear, fists
An elective office: president, vice-president, senator, mayor, treasurer, secretary, governor,
representative, congressman, councilman, chairman, sheriff
A type of human dwelling: house, apartment, tent, cave, hut, hotel, trailer, home, motel, shack,
mansion, cottage
An alcoholic beverage: beer, whiskey, gin, wine, vodka, bourbon, scotch, rum, brandy, rye,
champagne, vermouth
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Appendix B
GAD-7 assessment items
Over the last two weeks, how often have you been bothered by the following problems? (0 - not
at all, 1 - several days, 2 - more than half the days, 3 - nearly every day)
1. Feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge
2. Not being able to stop or control worrying
3. Worrying too much about different things
4. Trouble relaxing
5. Being so restless that it is hard to sit still
6. Becoming easily annoyed or irritable
7. Feeling afraid, as if something awful
8. might happen
If you checked any problems, how difficult have they made it for you to do your work, take care
of things at home, or get along with other people?
Not difficult at all
Somewhat difficult
Very difficult
Extremely difficult
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Appendix C
CAARS S:S assessment items
Listed below are items concerning behaviors or problems sometimes experienced by adults.
Read each item carefully and decide how much or how frequently each item describes you
recently. Indicate your response for each item by clicking the circle that corresponds to your
choice. (0 - not at all, never; 1 - , 2 - just a little, once in a while; 3 - pretty much, often; 4 - very
much, very frequently)
1. I interrupt others while talking.
2. I am always on the go as if driven by a motor.
3. I'm disorganized.
4. It's hard for me to stay in one place for very long.
5. It's hard for me to keep track of several things at once.
6. I'm bored easily.
7. I have a short fuse/ hot temper.
8. I still throw tantrums.
9. I avoid new challenges because I lack faith in my abilities.
10. I seek out fast paced, exciting activities.
11. I feel restless inside even if I am sitting still.
12. Things I see or hear distract me from what I am doing.
13. Many things set me off easily.
14. I am an underachiever.
15. I get down on myself.
16. I act okay on the outside, but inside I am unsure of myself.
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17. I can't get things done unless there is an absolute deadline.
18. I have trouble getting started on a task.
19. I intrude on others' activities.
20. My moods are unpredictable.
21. I'm absent minded in daily activities.
22. Sometimes my attention narrows so much that I'm oblivious to everything else; other
times it's so broad that everything distracts me.
23. I tend to squirm or fidget.
24. I can't keep my mind on something else unless it's really interesting.
25. I wish I had greater confidence in my abilities.
26. My past failures make it hard for me to believe in myself.
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Appendix D
ASRS assessment items
Please answer the questions below. As you answer each question, click on the circle indicating
the correct number that best describes how you have felt and conducted yourself over the past 6
months. (0 - never, 1 - rarely, 2 - sometimes, 3 - often, 4 - always)
1. How often do you have trouble wrapping up the final details of a project, once the
challenging parts have been done?
2. How often do you have difficulty getting things in order when you have to do a task that
requires organization?
3.

How often do you have trouble wrapping up the final details of a project, once the
challenging parts have been done?

4. When you have a task that requires a lot of thought, how often do you avoid or delay
getting started?
5. How often do you fidget or squirm with your hands or feet when you have to sit down
for a long time?
6. How often do you feel overly active and compelled to do things, like you were driven by
a motor?
7. How often do you make careless mistakes when you have to work on a boring or
difficult project?
8. How often do you have difficulty keeping your attention when you are doing boring or
repetitive work?
9. How often do you have difficulty concentrating on what people say to you, even when
they are speaking to you directly?
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10. How often do you misplace or have difficulty finding things at home or at work?
11. How often are you distracted by activity or noise around you?
12. How often do you leave your seat in meetings or other situations in which you are
expected to remain seated?
13. How often do you feel restless or fidgety?
14. How often do you have difficulty unwinding and relaxing when you have time to
yourself?
15. How often do you find yourself talking too much when you are in social situations?
16. When you’re in a conversation, how often do you find yourself finishing the sentences
of the people you are talking to, before they can finish them themselves?
17. How often do you have difficulty waiting your turn in situations when turn taking is
required?
18. How often do you interrupt others when they are busy?
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Appendix E
Stimuli presented in Brown-Peterson Task in Experiment 1b
A country: France, United States, Russia (USSR), England, Germany, Canada, Italy, Spain,
Mexico, China, Japan, Sweden
A unit of time: hour, minute, second, year, day, century, month, decade, week, millisecond, eon,
era
A relative: aunt, uncle, father, mother, brother, sister, cousin, grandmother, grandfather, nephew,
niece, husband
A unit of distance: mile, foot, inch, yard, meter, centimeter, kilometer, millimeter, rod,
light-year, decimeter, block
A metal: iron, copper, steel, gold, aluminum, silver, tin, zinc, brass, lead, bronze, magnesium
A type of reading material: magazine, book, newspaper, pamphlet, novel, text (book), paper,
comic book, short story, journal, brochure, letter
A military title: lieutenant, general, sergeant, private, captain, colonel, major, corporal, admiral,
commander, ensign, lieutenant colonel
A four-footed animal: dog, cat, horse, cow, lion, tiger, elephant, pig, bear, mouse, rat, deer
A kind of cloth: cotton, wool, silk, rayon, nylon, dacron, linen, satin, orlon, madras, velvet,
burlap
A color: blue, red, green, yellow, cyan, black, purple, white, pink, brown, violet, gray
A kitchen utensil: knife, spoon, fork, pan, pot, spatula, can opener, stove, bowl, mixer, cup, dish
A building for religious service: church, synagogue, temple, chapel, cathedral, mosque, shrine,
monastery, tabernacle, pagoda, sanctuary, basilica
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A part of speech: noun, adjective, pronoun, verb, adverb, conjunction, preposition, interjection,
participle, gerund, words, article
An article of furniture: chair, table, bed, sofa, desk, lamp, couch, dresser, television, stool,
bureau, rug
A part of the human body: legs, arms, head, eye, chin, nose, finger, ear, hand, toe, mouth,
stomach
A fruit: apple, orange, pear, banana, peach, grape, cherry, plum, grapefruit, lemon, tangerine,
apricot
A weapon: bayonet, gun, rifle, bomb, club, sword, arrow, pistol, rope, cannon, spear, fists
An elective office: president, vice-president, senator, mayor, treasurer, secretary, governor,
representative, congressman, councilman, chairman, sheriff
A type of human dwelling: house, apartment, tent, cave, hut, hotel, trailer, home, motel, shack,
mansion, cottage
An alcoholic beverage: beer, whiskey, gin, wine, vodka, bourbon, scotch, rum, brandy, rye,
champagne, vermouth

